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Abstract
This paper looks at the Hizbut Tahrir of  Malaysia and places it in the
context of the wider and deeper development of Muslim politics and mass
mobilisation across Asia and the world at large. While much has been
written about the Hizbut Tahrir of  Indonesia (HTI), little is known
about the HTM. This paper traces the initial arrival of  the HT to
Malaysia, via the network of Malaysian students and activists who were
educated abroad and who have managed to build their own inter-personal
networks and relationships outside the parameters of mainstream political
Islam and the state apparatus in the country. Furthermore it is interesting
to note that HTM in Malaysia takes its own unique stand on Islamic
issues with relation to the mainstream Islamic party PAS and the Malay-
Muslim UMNO party. The paper therefore attempts to locate the ideological
positioning of the HTM in the wider context of Islamist politics in
contemporary Malaysia and to analyse its relationship to the wider currents
of  ethno-communal as well as religious politics in the country as a whole.
Keywords: Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia, transnational movement, activists’
network, PAS, UMNO
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A. Introduction
Transnationalism is not a new phenomenon within the Islamic
religion. Islam has always maintained a transnational dimension. Various
rituals such as the annual pilgrimage to the holy city of Makkah
exemplify this. The medieval Caliphates within the Muslim World is
transnational and stretched from Europe to India. Early Sufis and
Muslim traders have always maintained a transnational network that
spanned the continents of Africa, Europe and Asia.
Yet, transnational Islam is today viewed with trepidation. This
has to do with the fact that many terrorist groups such as the Al-Qaeda
framed their ideology around the idea of  transnational Islam and the
revival of  the medieval Islamic Caliphate. Yet, Al-Qaeda is new
compared to another group that has placed the revival of the Islamic
Caliphate as its political aim since 1953. This group is the Hizbut-
Tahrir-al-Islami (HT). While Al-Qaeda used violence to achieve its
end goal of the Caliphate, HT has focused its activities towards
developing a core group of cadres who will be responsible for the re-
establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.
Today, HT has developed a massive network of  members and
have chapters in forty-five countries spanning five continents. In the
Southeast Asian region, HT has focused its attention on developing
strong chapters in Indonesia and Malaysia. While HT remain a marginal
group, its growth in Malaysia has become worrisome for many within
the Malaysian political system. Members of  the main ruling party, the
United Malay National Organization (UMNO) and the Islamic Party
of  Malaysia (PAS) perceive HT as a threat to their political base.1
In light of such opinions, it is the aim of this paper to analyze
the emergence of  Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia (HTM) as a political force in
the country. While HTM is today a small organization, the paper argues
that it is likely to emerge as a third alternative within the Malaysian
political system as the main Malay-Islamic parties, UMNO and PAS
reshape their respective Islamic agendas. The paper will be divided
into three parts. The first part will discuss the emergence of  HTM, its
aims and objectives. The second part of  the paper will examine the
–––––––––––––––––
1 Conversation with a member of UMNO in June 2007.
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political strategies of HTM. The last part will analyze the potential of
HTM to emerge as a third Islamist alternative within Malaysian political
system.2
1. The Origins of  Hizb ut-Tahrir
HTM is a chapter of the larger HT organization. Palestinian
Islamic scholar, Taqiduddin An-Nabhani, founded the organization in
1953. An-Nabhani came from a prestigious family of  eminent scholar.
His grandfather, Yusuf  An-Nabhani was a religious official of  the
Ottoman Caliphate. As such, he received his early education at various
prestigious Islamic institutions including the Al-Azhar University. Upon
completion of  his studies, An-Nabhani worked as a religious teacher.
Later he worked for the Shariah court in Haifa rising to the position of
Judge of Al-Ramla Court until the year 1948 when the Arab-Israeli
war broke out. The experience of the Arab-Israeli conflict affected
An-Nabhani tremendously. An-Nabhani felt that the loss the Arabs
encountered during the 1948 war was attributed to their failure to follow
the teachings of Islam.  He began developing a new approach to the
understanding of Islam, which fused modernist Islamic political
ideology, and traditional Islamic teachings. To implement the ideas he
had envisaged, An-Nabhani formed HT. For An-Nabhani, HT is a
political party, which is working towards the revival of  the medieval
Islamic Caliphate.
HT emerged largely due to the experience of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. However An-Nabhani felt that the party needed to expand to
other parts of  the Arab World. By the time of  his death in 1977, HT
had established chapters in virtually all Middle Eastern and North
African countries. HT expanded further under the leadership of  Sheikh
Abdul Qaleem Zalloum, its second leader. Interestingly, this expansion
occurred by chance. HT was seen as threat by Arab countries after it
initiated several coup attempts in Egypt and Jordan. Its members were
–––––––––––––––––
2 The author has utilized interviews and personal communications with
members of the HTM between 2005 and 2007 for the purposes of this paper. He also
attended several seminars and forums conducted by the TM in Kuala Lumpur, Melaka
and Johor Bahru. Due to the secretive nature of the party in Malaysia, the author will
keep the names of some of the HTM members anonymous.
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prosecuted and were forced to flee to Western countries including the
United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and United.3
Paradoxically, HT’s growth and expansion into other Muslim
countries occurred through the West. Armed with European passports
that allowed them to travel freely, HT members began traveling to
Muslim countries to spread its ideology.4 This began first with Central
Asian countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union and
subsequently to South and Southeast Asian countries.5 Under the
leadership of its third leader, Sheikh Ata Abu Rashta, HT expanded
significantly and built important bases in South and Southeast Asian
countries.6
2. Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Objectives and Methodology
HT claims to defer to Prophet Muhammad’s method of  setting
up the state of Madinah, which An-Nabhani described as the first
Islamic state. This supposed method of achieving power involved three
stages. In the first stage, known as the stage of  culturing, HT aims to
produce people who believe in the idea and the method of  the Party.
This group will form the core group of  leaders who would be responsible
for the revival of the Caliphate.
At the second stage, known as the stage of interaction with the
Muslim community, the party seeks to educate Muslims about the
importance of the Caliphate and the need to revive this Islamic
institution. At the third stage known as the stage of  the ruling, the
party works towards establishing a government, which will implement
Islam comprehensively.7 To achieve this final stage, the core group
–––––––––––––––––
3 Interview with Burhan Haniff, member of  Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, June 2007.
4 The movement activities in Central Asia were captured in Zeyno Baran, Hizb
ut-Tahrir : Islam’s Political Insurgency (Washington: Nixon Center Monograph. December
2004) and Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 115-137.
5 Interview with Maajid Nawaz, former member of  Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, Oct
2007.
6 Sheikh Ata Abu Rashta, the former spokesman for HT in Jordan took over
the helm of its leadership in 1995.
7 Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, The Method to Re-Establish the Khilafah and Resume the
Islamic Way of  Life (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), pp. 88-110.
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will seek nusrah (political assistance) from important members of the
society such as politicians, military leaders and civil society leaders.
A HT member drew parallel between this stage of  HT’s Islamic
Revolution to that of  Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision to disband
communism. He noted that Gorbachev had been a communist but yet
his decision and that of  key Soviet leaders to change the country’s
political system led to the collapse of communism and triumph of
capitalism. He noted that a similar development would occur in the
Muslim World leading to the formation of  this Islamic Caliphate.8 HT
opens its membership to all Muslims regardless of race, Islamic sects
and gender. As such, HT claims to have members who subscribed to
Shiite Islam in Iraq and Lebanon. This differentiates HT markedly from
many other Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood
who often view the Shiite beliefs negatively. Another interesting feature
of its membership is the fact that women were encouraged to be
members and held equal rights to men within the party.  Although,
women’s activities were often held separately, woman often sit in HT’s
leadership hierarchy.
B. History of  the Hizbut Tahrir in Malaysia
Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia began as a student-based movement,
recruiting mainly among the student community of  Malaysia. Many of
these students had been recruited while studying in universities such
as Imperial College, University of Sheffield and School of Oriental
and African Studies (SOAS) in the early 1990s.9 These initial members
of  HTM were seen to be insufficiently equipped by HT’s leadership in
the Middle East to start a strong and sustainable chapter of the party
in Malaysia. To assist the HTM leaders, HT’s main leadership instructed
a member of  Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) to move to Malaysia for
the purpose of preparing HTM members for their future role as leaders
of HTM in Malaysia. This member of HTI, Hafidz Abdurrahman is
now the chairman of  Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.
–––––––––––––––––
8 Interview with Fahmi Amhar, Member of  HTI Central Committee, April
2009, Jakarta.
9 Personal Communications with Hizb ut-Tahrir Malaysia members
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During its formative years, HTM utilized several front
organizations, including the Muslim Intellectual Network of the Malay
World (IKIN) to organize its activities. IKIN was formed in 1997 after
a large pool of HTM activists returned back to Malaysia from the UK.
Prior to this, there were pockets of HT members operating all around
Malaysia. However, they were not organized under a structured
leadership. At this point, the HT central leadership also placed
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore within the same wilayah.10 The HTM
leadership reported directly to the Mu’tamad (Representative of the
Amir of HT) in Indonesia, Muhammad al-Khaththath at this point of
time. As highlighted earlier, members of HTM refrained from using
the name Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia. This was to avoid prosecution from
the Malaysian government that viewed transnational groups like HT
with suspicion. The tense political climate following the sacking of
former Deputy Prime Minister of  Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim also meant
that political groups that are seen as a potential threat are likely to be
prosecuted.
During this formative year, HTM members underwent an intense
period of  studying HT’s key texts such as the Systems of  Islam, The
Political System of  Islam and The Economic System of  Islam. These
study sessions were led by Hafidz Abdurrahman. At the same, time,
HTM leaders were building smaller chapters of HTM in different parts
of  the country. They also assisted members of  HT in Singapore to
build a chapter of  the party.11
By 2004, HTM leaders felt sufficiently confident to elevate the
party to its next stage. HTM leaders began using the name Hizbut
Tahrir Malaysia more openly.12 HTM began to print its name in various
publications that it produced such as the Sautun Nahdah leaflet. They
also began to openly distribute these leaflets at mosques during the
weekly Friday prayers in Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Kota Bahru and Johore
–––––––––––––––––
10 Interview with Muhammad al-Khaththath, HTI Leader, August 2007, Jakarta.
11 For a detailed description of HT in Singapore, see Mohamed Nawab Mohamed
Osman, “Reviving the Caliphate in Malaysia”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (June
2009, forthcoming).
12 Interview with Hafidz Abdurrahman, Chairman of  HTI, August 2007,
Jakarta.
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Bahru. They also began to organize seminars and mass demonstrations
to expand its network throughout Malaysia. In 2006, HTM officially
sent in an application to the Malaysian authority to be registered as a
political organization.
In August 2007, HTM’s leader, Hakim Osman identified himself
openly as the President of HTM and the public face of HTM.
Interestingly, this is a departure from the usual practice of  HT in other
countries where HT is often represented by a spokesperson. However,
this is part of  its strategy to conform to the Malaysian norm of  having
the position of  President in Muslim organizations.
1. Leadership and Membership Composition
The official leader of HTM today is Hakim Osman. Hakim had
been a successful lawyer for several years. His esteemed clientele
included prominent Malaysian singer, Siti Nurhaliza. Hakim Osman
gave up his law practice to work full time for HTM. HTM’s
membership also boost many successful academics including
Dr. Sharifuddin Md Zain, the Head of  Department at the University
of  Malaya’s Chemistry Department, Dr Salehuddin Ibrahim, an
Associate Professor at the Electrical Engineering Department in
Malaysian Technological University and Dr Agus Arsad, lecturer at
the Polymeric Engineering Department in the same university. These
academics graduate from prominent UK universities such as the Imperial
College and University of Sheffield.
There are also economists, doctors and dentists who are members
of  the group. While many of  its members are highly educated and hail
from middle and upper-middle income backgrounds, there are several
members who are lay persons doing odd jobs such as lorry drivers and
mechanics. Outside the professional group, its key members are tertiary
students. These students are generally recruited from local universities
such as UM, UTM and the National University of Malaysia (UKM).
Prior to 2004, a Malaysian member of HT in the United Kingdom was
also assisting HTM in its recruitment process. This particular member
was married to a British citizen and had played a major role in recruiting
Malaysian tertiary students studying in the UK. In general, the HTM
members are from the highly educated group.
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The leadership structure of  HTM is similar to that of  the larger
HT. HT divides the Muslim World into different provinces known as
wilayah.13 In the minds of HT leaders, these wilayahs represent provinces
of their future Caliphate.14 At the apex of its leadership is the amir
(leader) of  Hizbut Tahrir. A committee made up of  its top leaders
assists the Amir. Little is known about this leadership and where they
are based. Some ex-members of the group speculated that these leaders
are either in Jordan or West Bank. The second layers of  leaders are
members of  the wilayah committee. A mu’tamad who reports directly to
the amir heads this committee. Communication between the amir and
mu’tamad occurs via emails that are encrypted. The amir also sends
envoys to visit a particular wilayah to monitor its developments and
resolved problems that may be occurring in the wilayah. In the case of
HTM, the official leader of  HTM is Hakim Osman. Yet, Hakim Osman
is likely to be the public face of HTM and the real leader of HTM
might only be known amongst members in the wilayah committee. The
third level of  its leadership structure is the local area committee. A
naqib leads this local committee. A local area committee also assists
the naqib. The naqib is in-charge of  halaqahs conducted in the locality.
Each member of the local committee (mushrif) leads halaqahs comprising
five to eight daris (students).
For most of  its history, Malaysia was placed in the same wilayah
as Indonesia and Singapore. This means that the head of the Malaysian
chapter was seen as the naqib and reported to the mu’ tamad in Indonesia.
In 2001, the Malaysian chapter was accorded the status of wilayah.15
As HTM began to expand, naqibs were appointed at the state level.16
By 2008, HTM has appointed naqibs in all of the Malaysian states
except for the states of Sabah and Sarawak. Similar to HT in other
parts of the world, HTM is growing in the important urban centers of
Malaysia such as Kuala Lumpur, Melaka and Johor Bahru.
–––––––––––––––––
13 Mohamed Nawab, “Reviving the Caliphate”.
14 For more on the leadership structure of  HT, see Taji-Farouki, Fundamental
Quest, p. 116
15 Interview with Muhammad Al-Khathath, August 2007, Jakarta,
16 Mohamed Nawab, “Reviving the Caliphate”.
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The process of attaining membership in HTM is indeed an
arduous one. Potential members are first identified through mass
activities organized by the party such as public lectures and seminars.
Those identified and deemed to be potential recruits are invited to
attend a weekly study circles called halaqah. Each halaqah is led and
managed by a HTM member known as the mushrif. The mushrif will
monitor the advancement of members in his study circle. Members
are gauged based on regular attendance, their religiosity (based on their
observance of  the five rituals of  Islam) and their leadership abilities.17
For HTM, halaqah are forums for discussions of  ideas related to the
concepts advocated by Hizbut Tahrir. Daris in these halaqah are also
required to master four key aspects of  HTM’s philosophy; Islam as an
Ideology, Islam as a Political Idea, Hizbut Tahrir as an Islamic political
organization and Islamic proselytizing process. It is only after the mushrif
of a halaqah is convinced that a daris is completely ready that he is
invited to attend a more structured halaqah known as the Halaqah
Murakkazah. By this stage, these daris are considered to be sympathizers
(official daris) of  the party. To inculcate an understanding of  Hizbut
Tahrir, the new mushrif will expose his daris to several important books
written by HT’s ideologues such as the Political System of  Islam,
Systems of Islam (Nizm al-Isla>m), Islamic Order and the Ideas of Hizb-
ut-Tahrir (Mafahim Hizb-ut-Tahrir). Daris are also asked to assist HTM
leaders in organizing activities such as seminars, talks and encouraged
to attend demonstrations.
It is through their enthusiasm and commitment in these activities
coupled with their internalization of  HTM’s concepts that a daris is
then invited to be a full member. Often this process may take up till
four years. Often, many daris will remain sympathizers and will never
elevate to the position of  full members. From here, one can deduced
that HTM is in fact an ‘elitist’ organization. Elitist here does not mean
that HTM recruits only from the highly educated group alone. However,
only a small group of chosen persons will lead the party in attaining its
goal of establishing the Caliphate. This is similar to the concept adopted
–––––––––––––––––
17 Interview with Dr. Sharifuddin, August 2006, Kuala Lumpur.
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by the Jamaat-e-Islami party in Pakistan when Pakistani thinker and
scholar Maulana Abul A’la Maududi led it.18
2. Attraction to HTM
As mentioned earlier, HTM is today growing in Malaysia. While
its size is minuscule compared to the larger Muslim organizations and
political groups, HTM has emerged as an important Muslim group.
Hafidz Abdurrahman noted that the growth of HT in Malaysia is faster
than its growth in Indonesia. He noted that by the time he left Malaysia
in 2004, HTM was already established in virtually all of the Malaysian
states. In addition, HTM has also received public attention because of
several actions it has taken in the past. This is indeed a remarkable
feat for a group that has only emerged publicly in 2005. Most
importantly, HTM is gaining more support from young highly educated
Malaysian Muslim. This is especially puzzling given that HTM’s aim
of reviving the Caliphate might be seen as romantic and irrational by
some. There are several factors that can explain the attraction to HTM.
a. Muslim Youth Identity Crisis
Like young Muslims in many countries, young Malaysia Muslims
are undergoing an identity crisis. Many Muslim youths have different
expectations from their society as compared to their parents. Many of
these youths have different cultural reference points, different life at
school or university and consume different styles of entertainment.
Unlike their parents, they are more likely to eat in one of the American
fast food outlets, watch MTV and wear clothes inspired by the latest
fashion in Hollywood.
The growing consumerism in Malaysia have led to social problems
such as drugs, over-drinking and unhealthy sexual behavior. The official
religious position represented by government sponsored institution and
by the opposition Islamic Party of  Malaysia (PAS) tend to focus on the
need for Muslim youths to reject Western culture. The tagline of  the
Islamic alternative view is that Muslim youths must adopt their Islamic-
Malay identity and reject the evils of  Western culture. This approach
–––––––––––––––––
18 See Sayyid Reza Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of  the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-
Islami of  Pakistan (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1994), pp. 28-47.
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to religion is often top-down and fails to relate to the experience of
these Muslim youths. Muslim parents in Malaysia often support these
views. As a result of  the onslaught of  Western consumer/popular culture
and the less than appealing Islamic alternative, Muslim youths are often
left confused about their identity. As a result, they either reject the
Islamic alternative and adopt what they deem as a Western identity or
adopt a new Islamist position. These youths often turn to pro-Islamic
groups such as PAS, the Malaysian Assembly of  Muslim Youths (ABIM)
and HTM.
At the same time, many of  those in the former group can turn to
become Islamists after they attain a certain age as they see a need to
‘repent’ from their ‘sins’. Such a process can be understood by the
experiences of  many HTM members. One HTM member noted that
he was leading a jahil (ignorant and un-Islamic) lifestyle often
frequenting pubs, drinking and womanizing. It was after he was left by
a woman that he was in love with that he decided to repent and was
assisted in doing so by a member of HTM.19 The question that should
then be posed is why young members of HTM choose HTM rather
than the myriad of other Islamic/Islamist groups and organizations
working in the country. This is probably best understood by
developments occurring within other Islamic groups.
b. Perceived Compromise of  PAS and Other Islamist Groups
Historically, the landscape of  Islamic groups in Malaysia has
remained the same. Many of  these groups are either aligned to PAS or
the United Malay National Organization (UMNO).20 In the 1980s and
1990s, PAS represented groups espousing for the formation of  an
Islamic State while UMNO strived to form a ‘moderate Islamic state’.
By the late 1990s, this trend seems to have change with UMNO leaders
increasingly using Islam as a political tool to out-Islamise and out-
maneuver PAS in the political battle between the two. However, the
formation of  the People’s Coalition (Pakatan Rakyat, PR) after the
2008 elections comprising of  PAS, the People’s Justice Party (Parti
–––––––––––––––––
19 Interview with a Member of  HTM. His name will not be revealed due to the
nature of his current position as a HTM leader.
20 There are exceptions to this such as the Muslim Professional Forum, which is
a neutral NGO.
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Keadilan Rakyat, PKR) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) have
resulted in a new development in PAS. PAS was  forced to moderate
their position on the Islamic state issue given the success of  the PAS
in the 2008 election. This has led to a discernible moderation of the
party’s Islamist commitment.  They were forced to focus on the more
egalitarian aspects of Islam such as social justice, protecting human
rights and establishing a corruption-free political system. This allowed
the party to work more effectively with its political partners in the PR
to establish a strong alternative to the current government led by
UMNO.
The moderation of  PAS has come at a cost. Many of  its more
puritan members are disappointed at the perceived decision of its
leaders to sacrifice the Islamist agendas at the expense of  power. Many
of  the Islamist NGOs are also supportive of  PAS’ moderate stance. In
discussions between leaders of the Jemaah Islah Malaysia (JIM) and
PAS held in July 2008, JIM had urged PAS to remain in the PR to
represent the position of pro-Islamic groups in Malaysia.21
The moderation of Islamist groups in Malaysia have led to an
influx in support for HTM or at least its position. In articles written by
its leaders, HTM has expressed disappointments with the state
governments led by PAS for allowing un-Islamic activities to continue
in these states such as pig rearing. Some of  its members have already
left the party to become members of HTM.22 One of these members
informed that his decision to quit PAS is due to the fact that he was
never really comfortable with PAS’ support for democracy and felt
that the approach that HTM advocate is a more Islamic approach.23
HTM is making a significant impact among students in various
institutions and have been able to draw it support from former members
of  Islamic student groups affiliated with PAS.24 Muslim youths who
are not affiliated to any Islamist group felt that HTM is more sincere in
–––––––––––––––––
21 Interview with Zaid Kamaruddin, President of  JIM, August 2008, Jakarta.
22 Conversation with former PAS Deputy President, Ustaz Hassan Shukri and
former PAS Youth chief, Ustaz Abu Bakar Chik, Mar 2008.
23 Conversation of  HTM member who was a former PAS member.
24 Interview with former PAS Deputy President, Ustaz Hassan Shukri.
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its efforts to revive Islam in the country. One of  this youth argued that
PAS is just seeking to win elections while HTM has no such ambition.25
He explained that the methodology espoused by HTM is one that
cannot corrupt an individual, as he or she will have nothing to gain
unlike a member of  PAS or UMNO who could be offered government
positions which comes with money and perks.26 For many young
members of HTM, the political independence of HTM is one of its
key attractions.
c. Mobilization Strategies
Disappointment with other Islamic organizations is not the only
factor that is attracting members to HTM. HTM has been able to
traditional successfully employ various recruitment strategies to its
advantage. HTM utilized methods of  recruitment such as producing
various publications. The most important of  these publications is Sautun
Nahdah. This is a weekly pamphlet that the group produces and
distributes at mosques throughout the country after the obligatory
Friday prayers. HTM also promotes the sale of  key texts of  the group.
These books are often translated in Indonesia and brought to Malaysia
by members of  Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia residing in Malaysia. HTM
also utilizes its website, www.mykhilafah.com to attract interest in the
group. The website features a daily reporting of  various domestic and
international news related to the Muslim World. These articles are often
followed by commentaries about the articles from members of HTM.27
HTM members have utilized the internet effectively for
recruitment purposes. HTM members are active bloggers.28 They are
also active contributors in online forums that are popular with young
Malaysian Muslims such as Ummah Online Forum and Melayu.com.29
In addition, several HTM members are also beginning to utilize the
increasingly popular networking site, Face Book, to encourage their
–––––––––––––––––
25 Interview with Hafiz Mujahid, December 2007, Kuala Lumpur.
26 Ibid.
27 Mohamed Nawab, “Reviving the Caliphate”.
28 See  http://hafizmujahid.multiply.com. Accessed on 2 May 2009.
29 For examples of  these postings, see http://www.geocities.com/
ummahonline/suratpembaca/suratpembaca05.htm and http://www.melayu.com/
v2/sembang2/mesej.php?thread=15184, Accessed on 30 December 2007.
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friends to attend HTM functions. Some of  HTM members are also
part of  various groups which form part of  the Face Book Online groups
such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir group, the Revival of  the Khilafah group
and the International Khilafah Conference 2007 group.30
Public demonstrations are another tool used by HTM in recruiting
new members. While other Islamic and political groups in Malaysia
commonly use demonstrations, the nature of  HTM’s demonstrations
is unique. At the height of the Gaza conflict in March 2009, Malaysian
Islamic groups and other NGOs began holding demonstrations against
the Israeli atrocities perpetrated on the Palestinians. Other groups began
boycotting American goods for the alleged support the Americans lent
to Israel. However, HTM held a demonstration outside the Ministry
of  Defence in Kuala Lumpur calling for the Malaysian army to dispatch
its troops to defend Palestine. This was an unprecedented move, which
drew large support for HTM.
d. Ideology
Prior to explaining the attractiveness of  its ideology to its
adherents, it is perhaps useful to briefly discuss the concept of  ideology
as formulated by political theorist Michael Freeden. Freeden rejects
the traditional definition of  ideology which sees it as a static belief
system. Rather, Freeden argues, that ideologies must be understood
from their respective semantic fields. For Freeden, ideology consists
of  concepts that will evolve and change over time.  Each ideology
may be seen as having both core and secondary concepts. Concepts
can become less or more important over time. Similiarly new concepts
may emerge to compliment or replace old concepts. By studying the
conceptual evolution of  ideologies, Freeden observes that the relative
“political success” of  an ideology depends on its ability to impose the
belief that its own conceptual definitions are the “correct ones”. The
prevalence of  a certain concept of  ideology is dependent on inter-
ideological and intra-ideological contest. Applying Freeden’s concept
of  ideology on the ideology of  Islamism, one would note that the core
concept in Islamism is its  rejection of secularism. All Islamists seek to
eliminate secularism from their respective societies. At the same time
–––––––––––––––––
30 Personal Observation of  Author on the Face Book website.
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the secondary concepts within Islamism might differ exemplified by
its position on democracy. While the Islamism ideology of  HT reject
democracy as being un-Islamic, the Islamism ideology of  the Muslim
Brotherhood accepts democracy as being compatible with Islam. It is
in this regard that HTM’s Islamism ideology seems to be prevailing
against other variants of  Islamism in Malaysia. HTM’s uncompromising
rejection of  democracy, capitalism and secularism have strengthened
its position significantly. It is seen to the true bearers of  Islamism by
many who are attracted to the ideology. While HTM take a strong
stand against issues such as Muslim conversion to other religions, PAS
is forced by political constraints to take a more measured stand on
such issues.
It is appropriate at this juncture to bring to the discussion ideas
by sociologist, Karl Mannheim about the concept of  ideology. For
Mannheim, the concept of  ideology has two important components,
ideology and utopia. Mannheim referred to ideology as total systems
of  thought held by society’s ruling groups to preserve the status quo
and hence their political positions. On the other hand, utopia is total
systems of  thoughts forged by groups opposed to the ruling elites who
are interested in the total transformation of  society and thus subscribe
to system of  ideas that direct total change of  society.  Mannheim argued
that
A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the immediate
situation and when passed onto actions, tend to shatter the order of
things.31
In many ways, the views held by HTM are utopian in nature. HT
is opposed to the current political and economic system and proposed
a complete overhaul of the current world system. Its ideas on the need
to revive the Islamic Caliphate is an example of this utopianism. It is
here again that HTM’s ideology is attractive to many of  its adherents.
The fact that its ideology is utopian means that it does not need to
provide its potential recruits with a real alternative. It simply needs to
–––––––––––––––––
31 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge
(London: Routledge & K Paul, 1966), p. 341.
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show that there are problems to the current world systems. HTM can
simply refer to the Islamic Caliphate and argue that this is the perfect
form of  governance. At best, they can provide members with abstract
ideas about the different systems that will be part of the future Caliphate
as can be seen in books such as the Political System of  Islam and the
Economic System of Islam.
Herein lies another reason why HTM is attracting recruits.
Members of HTM often refer to the Islamic Caliphate as the perfect
state where everything will run according to Islam. At the same time,
they refer to the Caliphate under the famed Caliph Umar Ibn Abdul
Aziz where the state was so prosperous that it was difficult to find
poor people to give zakat money to. It is vague and obscure yet romantic
vision that attract many youth to HTM.
C. Positioning HTM in Malaysian Politics
While, it may be too premature to estimate the impact of HTM
in Malaysian politics, it is plausible given the current political
developments that HTM may grow in number and influence. The
backgrounds of  HTM’s recruit (young and highly educated) points to
the possibility that it will continue to be influential in future. For many
young Malaysian Muslims, HTM represents a real alternative to PAS
and UMNO as the true bearer of  Islam in Malaysia. HTM is now being
viewed as a serious challenge by PAS and UMNO.
1. PAS and HTM: Intra-Islamist Conf lict
The relationship between PAS and HTM has been marked by
volatility over the last few years. PAS had initially maintained a neutral
position towards HTM. This is partly due to perceptions within the
party that HTM is an insignificant threat to PAS. Members of  PAS
Youth had even spoken at seminars organized by HTM. One of  its
members, Mohd Nazry Chik, a PAS Youth leader emphasized
similarities between the two groups. He noted that PAS and HTM are
working for revival of the Islamic Caliphate. He argued that the minor
difference between the two groups is PAS’s gradualist approach towards
the Caliphate issue while HTM strived for an immediate revival of the
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Islamic Caliphate.32 Yet, PAS has become more concerned about HTM.
In part, it is due to the fact that HTM has recruited PAS Youth
members.33
HTM is also making significant inroads into various institutions
at the expense of  PAS and its affiliated student groups. The threat
from HTM was seen to be major enough for the President of  PAS,
Abdul Hadi Awang to warn PAS members about the threat from HTM.34
HTM views PAS as a fellow Islamic group. However, it has not resisted
from criticizing its policies in various states that it is in power. For
instance, HTM has publicly slammed PAS leaders for exempting non-
Muslims from Islamic criminal laws. HTM argued that Islamic laws are
created for all mankind and PAS leaders are confused about this issue.35
The decision of  HTM has also stated clearly that PAS’s usage of
democracy to revive the Islamic Caliphate is un-Islamic. They have
declared elections as being un-Islamic and urged Malaysian Muslims
not to vote.36
While HTM is not successful in convincing Malaysians to avoid
elections at the national level, it’s impact at the student elections have
led to the lost of  PAS affiliated student groups.
2. HTM and UMNO: My Enemy’s Enemy is My Friend
For the leaders of  UMNO, HTM has been an insignificant Islamic
group. However, the fact that HTM is a part of  a global Islamic party
has been a major source of  concern for UMNO leaders. Some UMNO
members believe that HTM is aided and abetted by foreigners and is
doing the biddings of  these foreigners to subvert the country.
–––––––––––––––––
32 Seminar Organized by HTM titled America Post Sept 11: Ally or Adversary
Date, held on the 11th of Sept 2005.
33 Conversation with former PAS Deputy President, Ustaz Hassan Shukri and
former PAS Youth chief, Ustaz Abu Bakar Chik, Mar 2008.
34 See Inside Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia, Al-Islam, April 2006. Also see critique of
HTM by a PAS member online. http://www.sim.org.my/modules/newbb/
viewtopic.php?topic_id=815&forum=1&post_id=5492 Accessed on 9 May 2009.
35 “Hukum Islam DiWajibkan Untuk Semua”, Sautun Nahdah, No.156, 11
January 2008.
36 “Pandangan Hizbut Tahrir Mengenai Pilihanraya”, Sautun Nahdah, No. 164, 7
February 2008.
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Apparently, HTM is now seen as a threat big enough for the Malaysian
government that the Malaysian Special Branch is now watching the
group.37 In December 2006, a member of  HTM was arrested but
subsequently released in Temerloh, Pahang for distributing copies of
the Sautun Nahdah leaflet.
While HTM is seen to be a potential security threat, the Malaysian
government has not attempted to ban the party or clamp down on its
members. Many HTM leaders continue to do well in their careers in
government linked bodies such as the tertiary institutions. In fact, the
Malaysian government seems to be capitalizing on HTM’s anti-
democratic stance and radical discourse works to its government’s
advantage. HTM’s call for the boycott of  elections has seen the
weakening of  PAS and its affiliate bodies.38 The beneficiary of  HTM’s
anti-election stance is UMNO.39
On its part, HTM has been highly critical of the Malaysian
government and UMNO leaders. HTM members have criticized every
single policy of the government in their writings in Sautun Nahdah. In
its most recent attack on UMNO, HTM has accused the government
of being anti-Islam.40 This is due to the fact that the Malaysian court
had awarded custody of children to a Hindu lady whose husband had
converted to Islam. It is likely that UMNO and the Malaysian
government will re-look its policy towards HTM as HTM grows in
size and influence.
–––––––––––––––––
37 HTM claims that they are now under surveillance of  the Malaysian security
outfit. This was stated openly by a HTM speaker at a HTM seminar organized in Kuala
Lumpur when he included the Malaysian Special Branch officers in his list of salutation
at a Hizbut Tahrir Seminar. See Hizbut Tahrir Seminar on HIJRAH: Titik Mula Islam
Sebagai Tamadun Baru Dunia 20 January 2007, Malaysian Islamic College Mosque, Seksyen
16, Petaling Jaya. In his address, Esa Abdullah, a HTM member openly gave his salaam
to members of the Malaysian Security Branch even waving his hands at two gentlemen
who were filming the whole seminar.
38 For more on PAS’ moderating stance, see Mohamed Nawab Mohamed
Osman, “PAS: From Islamism to Post-Islamism”, Jakarta Post, 17 Mar 2008.
39 Culled from a confidential source.
40 “Demi Undi Agama Allah Ditukar Sesuka Hati”, Sautun Nahdah, No. 181, 12
May 2009.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009 M/1430 H 109
Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia
3. Creating a Third Front for Islamists
The potential of HTM emerging as a third Islamist is low in the
near future. This is due to the fact that PAS and other Islamist
organizations remain viable vehicles for many Islamists. However in
the long run, this possibility cannot be ruled out. As PAS moves more
centre in its political position which is inevitable given the current
political developments, HTM is likely to attract more of its members
who are hardcore Islamists. At the same time, HTM seems to be building
important ties with members of  the Malaysian religious bureaucracy.
Several of its members are working in the government religious
bureaucracy. At the same time, they held meetings with several Muftis
in Malaysia. Through some of these interactions, HTM has created a
reputation as a true advocate for Islam. One of  these Muftis felt that
HTM is an Islamic group that is sincerely trying to revive Islam.41 The
increasing independence of the Malaysian religious bureaucracy and
the opposing views (from the Malaysian government) that ulama held
over issues related to converting out of Islam is likely to leave a vacuum
for HTM to fill. It is unlikely that these ulama will turn to PAS as PAS
itself is forced to take a neutral position on these issues due to political
considerations. As such, some of  these ulama might turn to HTM to
champion their position. This will inevitably lead to HTM emerging as
a third front for Islamists in Malaysia. Developments in the region
such as the success of  Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia are also likely to affect
the strength of HTM. Ripple effects is likely to be felt in Malaysia if a
major development is to occur in Indonesia in relation to HTI.
–––––––––––––––––
41 Conversation with Dato’ Harrunsani, Mufti of Perak, June 2006, Singapore.
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